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TOO  MANY  COOKS  IN  THE  KITCHEN?:  THE
POTENTIAL  CONCERNS  OF  FINDING  MORE
PARENTS  AND  FEWER  LEGAL  STRANGERS
IN  CALIFORNIA’S  RECENTLY-
PROPOSED  MULTIPLE-PARENTS  BILL
Elizabeth A. Pfenson*
“When it comes to parenting, three’s a crowd.”1
INTRODUCTION
While “family life” remains an important source of joy for the vast
majority of Americans,2 the shape and structure of American family
units have changed rapidly such that many American families today
would have been almost inconceivable even fifty years ago.3  Just over
one-third of Americans say that the institution of marriage is becom-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2014; Bachelor
of Arts, Gordon College, Class of 2010.  I thank Professor Margaret Brinig for
bringing this Bill to my attention and for providing invaluable guidance during the
writing process.  I also thank my husband Thomas, without whom this Note very likely
wouldn’t have happened, as well as James and the Pfeffer family for their loving
support.  Finally, I thank my classmates and the Notre Dame Law Review staff members,
especially Brian Wright-Bushman, for providing helpful suggestions and insights
throughout the editing process.
1 Elizabeth Marquardt & John Culhane, California Should Not Pass “Multiple Par-
ents” Bill, HUFFPOST LOS ANGELES (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
elizabeth-marquardt/multiple-parents-bill_b_1791709.html.
2 98% of Americans say that family is, if not the most important element of their
lives, at least one of the most important. The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Fami-
lies, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Decline of Marriage Research],
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-
new-families/ (specifically noting that 76% say family is the most important element
and that 22% say family is one of the most important elements of life).
3 Id.; see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion); Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Introduction, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 1 (Robin Fretwell Wilson
ed., 2006) (“The family has undergone almost revolutionary reconfigurations over the
past generation. . . . [T]he pace of these changes has become almost frenetic.”).
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ing obsolete, and increasingly fewer Americans think that the tradi-
tional family structure of one father and one mother living together
with their biological children is worth pursuing.4  As of 2008, only
52% of Americans adults were married.5  A large majority of Ameri-
cans no longer think of marriage as the only way to form a new fam-
ily—86% of Americans identify a single parent and child as a family,
80% identify an unmarried couple living together with a child as a
family, and 63% agree that a gay or lesbian couple raising a child
together constitutes a family.6  Families, once established, are becom-
ing increasingly more fluid—more than 40% of American adults have
at least one step-relative in their family.7
In this developing cultural landscape, fewer women feel the need
to wait until they are married to bear children,8 and, as of 2010,
roughly 27% of American fathers lived apart from at least one of their
children.9  Multi-partner fertility (having children with more than one
partner) has become more prevalent, and accordingly children live in
an increasingly diverse array of households.10
While family units come in a variety of shapes and sizes, there are
a number of ways for a child to enter the world as well.  Individuals or
couples wishing to have a child have many options open to them,
4 While 61% of Americans would agree that “a child needs both mother and
father to grow up happily,” only 43% say that cohabiting outside of marriage, unmar-
ried couples raising children, and more gay couples raising children are “bad for
society.” Decline of Marriage Research, supra note 2. R
5 Id.
6 Id.  These numbers are likely to increase in the next ten to twenty years—
Americans sixty-five and older are more likely to say that those living in non-tradi-
tional arrangements are not families, while younger adults tend to be more open to
alternative arrangements. Id.
7 A Portrait of Stepfamilies, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 13, 2011), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/01/13/a-portrait-of-stepfamilies/.
8 In 2008, 41% of babies were born to mothers who were unmarried. Decline of
Marriage Research, supra note 2.  However, 61% of Americans still say that the trend R
toward single motherhood without a male partner to assist them in raising their chil-
dren is a bad development for society. Id. Adults of the Millennial Generation partic-
ularly value parenthood far more than they value marriage—52% of this age group
say that being a good parent is “one of the most important things” in life, while only
30% say that having a successful marriage is.  Wendy Wang & Paul Taylor, For Millenni-
als, Parenthood Trumps Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2011/03/09/for-millennials-parenthood-trumps-marriage/.
9 Gretchen Livingston & Kim Parker, A Tale of Two Fathers: More Are Active, but
More Are Absent, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 15, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.
org/2011/06/15/a-tale-of-two-fathers/.  These fathers have varying degrees of con-
tact with their children. Id.
10 Almost 20% of biological fathers have reportedly fathered children with more
than one woman. Id.
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including purchasing donor eggs or sperm, arranging for a traditional
or gestational surrogate, procuring embryo donations, or some combi-
nation thereof.11  An estimated 30,000–60,000 children are conceived
in the United States annually through sperm donations.12  Over 1% of
all children born in the United States every year are conceived using
artificial reproductive technologies, which include methods described
above as well as methods in which eggs are removed from a woman’s
ovaries, combined with sperm in a laboratory, and then returned to
that woman or another host.13
In cases where an egg from one person is combined with the
sperm from another and implanted into a surrogate, with the inten-
tion that the resulting child will be placed with an entirely different
set of parents, what a court should do when the surrogate wants to
keep the baby14 or when one or both of the intended parents back
out15 can be an entirely open question.  Determinations of
parenthood and appropriate custodial arrangements can also be diffi-
cult when children are conceived “the natural way.”  Courts routinely
face situations in which a married woman has a child by another
man,16 or where a lesbian woman and a male friend conceive with the
intention that she raise the child with her partner (with or without the
man’s involvement).17
11 See Elizabeth Marquardt et al., My Daddy’s Name Is Donor: A New Study of Young
Adults Conceived Through Sperm Donation, INST. FOR AM. VALUES (2010), available at
http://www.familyscholars.org/assets/Donor_FINAL.pdf (describing the developing
international artificial insemination industry).
12 Id.
13 What Is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Jan. Feb. 7, 2013).
14 See Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html?
pagewanted=all (describing a situation in which an intended mother selected an egg
donor, sperm donor, and gestational surrogate and welcomed twins home when they
were born, only to be required to relinquish them one month later after the surrogate
mother, who had learned of the intended mother’s mental illness, obtained a court
order to retrieve them).
15 See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (treating
both intended parents as natural parents when the intended father filed for divorce
and alleged there were no children of the marriage six days before the surrogate gave
birth to a child genetically unrelated to herself or the intended parents).
16 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
17 See Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Kevin Gray, Flor-
ida Judge Approves Birth Certificate Listing Three Parents, NBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2013), http:/
/usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/07/16889720-florida-judge-approves-birth-
certificate-listing-three-parents?lite (reporting that a Florida judge approved a birth
certificate listing three parents where a lesbian couple used the donated sperm of one
woman’s hair dresser, who then wanted to remain involved in raising the child).
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Determining who a child’s parents are has been and remains a
very important endeavor undertaken by courts, as state law is largely
built on a system that prefers parents over non-parents in making cus-
tody determinations and confers certain rights and responsibilities
only on the very limited number of people that the state recognizes as
“parents.”18  Traditionally, this limited number has been two, but
some judges have responded to the unique families that come into
their courtrooms by increasing that number.
Legislators have considered ways to increase the flexibility that
judges have when adjudicating family structures.  One such legislator,
California State Senator Mark Leno, who was moved by a particularly
messy dependency action that turned on the court’s determination of
a child’s parentage,19 introduced Senate Bill No. 1476 (the “Bill”) in
early 2012 in an attempt to provide for more equitable outcomes in
family court proceedings.20  The Bill was designed to give courts the
authority to find that children could, in situations of conflicting pre-
sumptions of parenthood, have more than two parents if such a find-
ing would be required to protect the best interests of the child.21  In
formulating the Bill, Senator Leno relied on movements toward offi-
cial recognition of multiple parenthood occurring in the statehouses
and courthouses of the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maine, and
Pennsylvania.22  This Bill was ultimately vetoed by Governor Edmund
G. Brown, Jr., in September, 2012,23 but the issues raised by the Bill
are by no means settled.  It is likely that a largely similar bill may be
passed in the near future given certain proposals in academia and the
growing sense among some that judges need more ways to deal with
complex family units.
18 See Katharine K. Baker, Asymmetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY,
supra note 3, 121, 127 (“Traditionally, whoever had rights had responsibilities and the R
only people who had rights and responsibilities were parents.”); David D. Meyer, Part-
ners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE
FAMILY, supra note 3, 47, 49. R
19 See In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011).
20 S.B. 1476, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) [hereinafter Senate Bill 1476], avail-
able at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120
SB1476&search_keywords=.
21 S. JUDICIARY COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1476, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal.
May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Senate Bill 1476 May 8 Analysis], available at http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_cfa_20120507_170523_sen_
comm.html.
22 See infra Part II.
23 S.B.-1476 Family Law: Parentage—Status, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. [hereinafter Senate
Bill 1476 Veto Message], available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/
sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_vt_20120930.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
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This Note explores issues surrounding the concept of multiple
parenthood, looking closely at Senator Leno’s Bill and also the move-
ments in other states cited by Senator Leno for support.  It argues that
allowing courts to find that a child has more than two parents—with
all of the attendant rights and responsibilities of parenthood—raises
constitutional concerns as well as very serious practical problems
affecting the health and well-being of the child.  Part I of the Note
examines the relevant legal doctrines informing the issue of
parenthood, looking first at the constitutional framework of
parenthood, second at presumptions of parenthood that have tradi-
tionally provided for determinations of paternity and maternity, and
third at other doctrines that have developed to provide rights and
responsibilities to those adults other than natural parents (including
in loco parentis, parenthood by estoppel, de facto parenthood, and
third party or grandparent visitation statutes).  Part I further
introduces the “best interests” standard, state child support systems,
and the reasoning behind both, in order to provide background to a
discussion of the practical impact of the Bill.  Part II then examines
how these doctrines have been employed and wielded in the District
of Columbia, Delaware, Maine, and Pennsylvania.  Part III focuses on
California and the Bill, providing an analysis of the Bill’s application
of the best interests standard, the concept of child support, and the
nature of its provision for multiple parents.  Part IV examines the
likely practical effects of such legislation and suggests that providing
for a child to have more than two parents may create unintended neg-
ative consequences.  The Note concludes that the expansion of rights
for one class of people (those seeking parenthood status) results in a
decrease in the rights of natural or adoptive parents, ultimately harm-
ing the child more than anyone else.
I. RELEVANT LEGAL DOCTRINES
A. The Constitutional Rights of Families, Parents, and Children
  The “sanctity” of the family unit is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”24  Parents have a fundamental liberty interest
in the care, custody, and control of their children; this liberty interest
“is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by [the Supreme Court]” and is protected by the Due Process Clause
24 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 6 22-APR-13 11:11
2028 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
of the Fourteenth Amendment.25  Parents’ fundamental rights
include directing the upbringing and education of their children26
and “the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
[the child] for additional obligations”27 as well.  Recognizing that his-
torically the legal concept of family had some connection to property
law, in Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court squarely rested the modern
legal concept of family on the “presumption that parents possess what
a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life’s difficult decisions,” and, more importantly,
that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests
of their children.”28  Due to these presumptions and the historic
respect that the State has had for the integrity of the family unit, so
long as a parent is not unfit there is normally no reason for the State
to question his or her decisions.29  Parents also have a fundamental
right to control with whom their child associates and develops rela-
tionships as a derivative of their right to control the child’s upbring-
ing.30  Courts cannot infringe on these fundamental parental rights
merely because they might think a better decision could have been
made.31
On a few occasions the Supreme Court has taken up the constitu-
tionality of what it means to be a legally-recognized parent in the first
place.  While biology plays a major role in the determination of
parenthood, it is not conclusive.  In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court held
that biology alone does not necessarily afford a natural parent consti-
25 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”).
26 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children.  This primary role . . . is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
27 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
28 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
29 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69.
30 Id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (“Meyer’s repeatedly recognized right of
upbringing would be a sham if it failed to encompass the right to be free of judicially
compelled visitation by any party at any time a judge believed he could make a better
decision than the objecting parent had done.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  “The strength of a parent’s interest in controlling a child’s associ-
ates is as obvious as the influence of personal associations on the development of the
child’s social and moral character.  Whether for good or for ill, adults not only influ-
ence but may indoctrinate children . . . .” Id.
31 Id. at 72–73 (plurality opinion).
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tutionally-protected rights.32  The Court explained that the “signifi-
cance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship
with his offspring”—an opportunity that must be grasped before it can
be enjoyed.33  Biology alone does not always establish a male’s legal
parenthood—in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court found that states
could have overriding policy interests that justify denying a so-called
natural father the right to a parent-child relationship when another
man was presumed to be the child’s father.34  The Supreme Court has
not defined parenthood in terms of one’s function in the child’s life
or intent to be a parent, but an increasing number of state courts fill
the gap that was left when the Supreme Court rejected determinations
of parenthood by biology alone with theories of functionality and
intent.35
The rights of children have received less attention from the
Supreme Court than the rights and responsibilities of parents.  On
one occasion the Court dismissed out of hand the idea that a child
might have a right to maintain filial relationships with more than two
parents, arguing that whatever the psychological benefit of such
arrangements to a child may be, the history and traditions of the
32 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
33 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
34 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129–30 (1989) (plurality opinion); see
infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.  However, the question of whether more
than two parents can have constitutionally-protected relationships with a child is far
from settled, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion. Michael H., 491 U.S.
at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Five members of the Court refuse to foreclose the
possibility that a natural father might ever have a constitutionally protected interest in
his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with,
another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
35 For a discussion of the concept of functional parenthood, see infra Part I.C.
Courts generally resort to concepts of intent to determine parenthood only in cases of
artificial insemination and surrogacy, most often in the context of same-sex couples.
See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text; see also Elizabeth Marquardt, One Parent
or Five: A Global Look at Today’s New Intentional Families, INST. FOR AM. VALUES (2011),
available at http://www.familyscholars.org/assets/One-Parent-or-Five.pdf (looking at
a variety of “intentional” parenting arrangements between individuals, couples, and
even groups of adults).  Courts and legislators approach the concept of parenthood
by intent with caution and apply it only to aforementioned cases motivated by the
obvious policy concern that such a doctrine could facilitate irresponsible sexual activ-
ity at the expense of the resulting child. See also Meyer, supra note 18 (considering R
the nature of parenthood as contemplated by the Constitution and concluding that
the state is able to constitutionally create certain new parenting roles).
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nation do not support the finding of such a constitutional right.36  Yet
eleven years later, in his dissent in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens
suggested that children have liberty interests in established familial
structures worthy of constitutional protection.37  Children may have
constitutional liberty interests that at times conflict with those of their
parents, but the Supreme Court has yet to explore this idea fully.38
Family law largely remains governed by state law with some consti-
tutional parameters.  These next Sections examine various doctrines
that have been developed and applied in a variety of ways to family
structures.
B. Presuming Parenthood: The Uniform Parentage Act and
Presumptions in State Law
  The presumption of parenthood dates back to the common law,
where it operated to presume that the husband of a woman who had
given birth was the father of the child.39  Traditionally, the presump-
tion of parenthood only operated to establish paternity; maternity was
established by a woman’s giving birth.  This strong paternal presump-
tion could only be rebutted where there was proof that a husband was
sterile or impotent or where the husband had no access to his wife
during the relevant period.40  The existence of the presumption in
state law stems from a policy desiring to promote peace and tranquil-
ity in family units by eliminating inquiries into paternity that would be
destructive to family integrity and privacy.41  Because of the degree to
36 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130–31 (plurality opinion).
37 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]o
the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such
intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must
their interests be balanced in the equation.”).
38 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004).  For exten-
sive discussion of the rights of children and how such a focus could impact a child’s
relationship with adults, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
(2006).
39 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (plurality opinion).  “The conclusive presumption
is actually a substantive rule of law based upon a determination by the Legislature as a
matter of overriding social policy, that given a certain relationship between the hus-
band and wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child . . . .” Id. at 119
(quoting Michael H. v. Gerard D., 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
40 See id. at 124.  A husband would conclusively not have had access to his wife if,
for example, he was at sea or at war.
41 See id. at 120, 124–25.  The original policy motivating the presumption was a
reluctance to find children illegitimate, but as illegitimacy has become less relevant
presumptions are now justified on other grounds. Id. at 124–25.
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which legislative policy determines presumptions, states have a certain
degree of flexibility in determining their presumptions without fear of
treading upon constitutional rights.42  Presumptions streamline the
process of determining a child’s parents, remove unnecessary litiga-
tion, and allow family units to rely on their arrangements without fear
that their relationships will be called into doubt.  Moreover, in the vast
majority of cases, the presumed parents are indeed the biological
parents.
In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the first version of the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), after which presumptions in many state codes are modeled.43
The UPA was revised twice—first to clarify methods of identifying
fathers, and second so that children of unmarried parents would be
treated the same as children of married parents.44  Under the regime
of the UPA and most states,45 a parent-child relationship can be estab-
lished several ways, including by adjudication of a court or by adop-
tion decree.46  A woman’s parent-child relationship can be established
by proof that she gave birth to the child.47  A man’s parent-child rela-
tionship can be established by an effective acknowledgement of pater-
nity or, more commonly, by an un-rebutted presumption of
paternity.48  A man is presumed to be the father of a child if he was
married to the mother and the child was born during the marriage or
immediately after the marriage ended, if he married the mother after
the birth of the child and then voluntarily asserted paternity, or if, for
the first two years of the child’s life, he resided with the child and
“openly held out the child as his own.”49
The most current version of the UPA is meant to be gender-neu-
tral, so provisions that pertain to determinations of paternity also
apply to determinations of maternity.50  In states that have adopted
42 Id. at 129–30 (“It is a question of legislative policy and not constitutional law
whether California will allow the presumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain
a child conceived within and born into their marriage to be rebutted.”).
43 Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 733 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010).
44 Id. at 734.  As noted by the Bancroft court, in every round of revisions the UPA
continues to focus on two adults entering some form of agreement from the begin-
ning that results in the birth of a child. Id. at 739.
45 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004 & Supp. 2013); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/
5(a)(1)–(2) (2003).
46 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (1973) (amended 2002).
47 Id. § 201(a)(1).
48 Id. § 201(b).
49 Id. § 204(a)(3)–(5).
50 Id. § 106.
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this section of the UPA, this provision is particularly relevant for same-
sex couples.  Otherwise, “cases involving disputed maternity are
extraordinarily rare.”51
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court took up the consti-
tutionality of presumptions of parenthood.52  In that case, under the
existing California statute, a child born to a married woman was pre-
sumed to be the child of her husband, despite the fact that a paternity
test showed a 98.07% probability that her adulterous lover was the
child’s father.53  The Court held that it was constitutional for Califor-
nia to maintain a system of presumptions such that occasionally natu-
ral fathers like the one in Michael H. would be denied the
constitutional right to have a relationship with their child.54
The most common way for an adult to gain legal recognition as a
parent is through a presumption.  Presumptions invite controversy,
though, as sometimes multiple presumptions can arise and conflict
with one another, resulting in claims of parenthood by more than two
people.55
C. Other Avenues for Gaining the Rights and Responsibilities
Usually Reserved for Parents
  Over time, courts and scholars have developed various doctrines
that award parental rights or responsibilities to those other than the
natural, adoptive, or presumed parents.  These doctrines enjoy vary-
ing levels of acceptance throughout the fifty states.  This Section
describes these doctrines, their motivations, and what they
accomplish.
1. In Loco Parentis
  When a person has in loco parentis status, he or she is said to stand in
the place of a legal parent.  At common law, the doctrine of in loco
51 Id. § 106 cmt.  However, as surrogacy gains in popularity, courts are called
upon to resolve maternity disputes with increasing frequency. See Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (resolving a maternity dispute between a husband and wife
and the surrogate in whom the couple’s fertilized egg had been implanted against the
surrogate).
52 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); see supra note
36 and accompanying text.
53 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113–16.  Under existing California law blood tests could
only be used to rebut a presumption if a motion was made within two years of the
child’s birth by either the husband or wife. Id. at 115.
54 Id. at 129–30.
55 For more on the role of presumptions, see the discussion of In re M.C., infra
Part III.A.
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parentis was historically used in the educational context: the teacher
was thought to stand in the place of the parent and was therefore able
to punish the child for infractions committed while at school.56  The
doctrine has since been expanded to parental rights contexts, as
courts use it to seek equitable outcomes.  One Pennsylvania court has
succinctly articulated the in loco parentis doctrine:
[A] person may put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by
assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship with-
out going through the formality of a legal adoption.  This status . . .
embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a parental status, and
second, the discharge of parental duties.  The rights and liabilities
arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same
as between parent and child.57
Once an in loco parentis relationship has been found, a court can con-
fer parental rights and obligations on that party, including visitation
rights, the duty of child support, and even the right to custody.58
Notably, a court cannot find an in loco parentis relationship without
intent on the part of the third party to enter into a parental relation-
ship—assumption of only a few duties is not enough.59
2. Parenthood by Estoppel
  The concepts of parenthood by estoppel and de facto parenthood60
were first systematically expounded in the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution (“the Principles”),61 a major work by the American Law
Institute (“ALI”) that was eleven years in the making.62 Because of
the novelty of their ideas and the influence that the ALI has had on
the development of American law with other works such as the Restate-
ments, the concepts found in the Principles will likely continue to influ-
ence the American family law landscape.63
56 See Tyler Stoehr, Note, Letting the Legislature Decide: Why the Court’s Use of In Loco
Parentis Ought to Be Praised, Not Condemned, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1695, 1697–1700 (2011).
57 Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
58 See Bryce Levine, Note, Divorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco Paren-
tis Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution Proceeding,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 324, 326 (1996).
59 See id. at 325–26.
60 See infra Part I.C.3.
61 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2002) [herein-
after ALI PRINCIPLES].
62 See RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 3, at 1.
63 See id. at 1–3; see also Meyer, supra note 18, at 47 (“The Principles’ R
approach . . . . proposes not merely to tinker with the criteria for selecting a child’s
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According to the ALI’s proposals, a child’s “parents” would
include his or her parents,64 parents by estoppel, and de facto par-
ents.65  Under this regime someone can become a parent by estoppel
in any of four ways: he or she (i) is obligated to pay child support, (ii)
lived with the child for at least two years, either believing that he or
she was the parent and acting accordingly or continuing to act as a
parent even after finding out that he or she was not, (iii) lived with
the child since birth holding himself or herself out as the parent and
acting accordingly, or (iv) lived with the child for two years holding
himself or herself out as the parent pursuant to an agreement with the
legal parent.66  This category of parenthood is meant to keep legal
parents from preventing a non-biological, non-legal, functional parent
from exercising custodial rights after that legal parent facilitated or
permitted the relationship.67  The Principles specifically note that a
child can have parents by estoppel in addition to two legal parents,68
and other legal parents would enjoy no preferential treatment over a
parent by estoppel.69  Parents by estoppel would be liable for child
support, but interestingly, parents by estoppel would not be required
to pay child support if two legal parents were already responsible
under the ALI’s regime.70  Parents by estoppel could, therefore, enjoy
parental rights without incurring corresponding parental
responsibilities.
3. De Facto Parenthood
  De facto parents are those adults other than legal parents or parents
by estoppel who, subject to certain qualifications, had a relationship
with the child worthy of being maintained and recognized by the
courts.  The main purpose of the de facto standard is to provide con-
tinuing contact between a child and an adult with whom the child may
have formed a deep and meaningful relationship.71  In the Principles,
custodian or the nature of custodial rights, but to rethink the very idea of
parenthood.”).
64 In the ALI’s regime, a child’s legal parent is “any individual recognized as a
parent under other state law.” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 2.03(1)(a).
65 Id. § 2.03(1).
66 Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
67 See Baker, supra note 18, at 123. R
68 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 2.03(1)(b)(iv).
69 Id. § 2.08(1).
70 Id. § 3.03(2)(c); see Baker, supra note 18, at 123, 125, 126. R
71 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 2.08(1)(h) (stating that, in allocating cus- R
todial responsibility among parents, the court should “avoid substantial and almost
certain harm to the child”). But see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique
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the drafters propose a three-prong test for determining whether a for-
mer live-in partner is a de facto parent: (i) one must live with the child
for “a significant period of time not less than two years,”72
(ii) regularly perform at least as many caretaking functions for the
child as the custodial parent,73 and (iii) the child’s custodial parent
must agree to the development of a parent-child relationship with that
person.74  Notably, the standard does not require a showing that con-
tinuing contact be in the best interests of the child.75
De facto parenthood confers on individuals certain parental
rights and responsibilities, including custodial rights and the responsi-
bility of making significant decisions for the child, such as those deci-
sions regarding the child’s education, health care, and religious
upbringing.76  Under the ALI’s standard, after the adults’ relationship
ends, the de facto parent (like any other parent) would receive a
share of time with the child determined pursuant to the approxima-
tion standard—an amount of time proportional to the caretaking per-
formed77—even over the objection of the natural parent.78  De facto
parents occupy somewhat of a lesser status compared to legal parents
and parents by estoppel, however, as they cannot be awarded the
majority of custodial responsibility of a child over the objection of
legal parents and parents by estoppel.79  De facto parents would not
be responsible for child support, however, increasing the rights of this
class of persons without proportionately heightening their responsibil-
of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103,
1117 (2010) (criticizing the ALI for “blindly assum[ing] that the loss of contact will
negatively affect a child” without requiring that the court inquire into the closeness of
the relationship).
72 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 2.03(1)(c)(i). R
73 Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(A)–(B).  Caretaking functions include those tasks that
“involve interaction with the child or that direct, arrange, and supervise the interac-
tion and care provided by others,” including things like feeding, washing, protecting,
providing transportation, toilet training, disciplining, supervising homework, and tak-
ing the child to the doctor. Id. § 2.03(5).
74 Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii).  Notably, the custodial parent’s agreement can be implied.
Id. § 2.03 cmt. c(iii).  This requirement is dispensed with if the parent is absent or
virtually absent from the child’s life. Id.
75 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of
De Facto Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 3, at 90, 94.
76 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, §§ 2.08, cmt. a; 2.09, cmts. a–b; 2.18. R
77 Id. § 2.08(1).  The approximation rule is a rejection of the ever-popular best
interests of the child standard. Id. at cmt. b.
78 See Wilson, supra note 75, at 99 (finding this problematic as some relationships R
end because of a partner’s poor interactions with children).
79 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 2.18(1)(a). R
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ities.80  De facto parents are expected to continue their relationship
with the child and to continue to parent the child as much as possible.
In the ALI’s regime, all parents—including legal parents, parents
by estoppel, de facto parents, biological parents who are not legal par-
ents but have agreements with a legal parent, and other individuals
with custodial responsibility—have a right to be notified of and
included in certain proceedings brought by others.81  Further, an
even wider net of individuals may receive a judicial allocation of custo-
dial responsibility by filing a proposed parenting plan for the child.82
The ALI proposal has at best received mixed reviews in the courts
and has not been adopted in any significant way by any state.83  The
Principles intentionally create the possibility that a child can have more
than two parents at any given time—a possibility that has undoubtedly
contributed to the wariness with which courts and legislators
approach the Principles.84  Scholars have also criticized the Principles
for infringing too much on a legal parent’s rights.85
4. Third Party and Grandparent Visitation Statutes
  Non-parental visitation rights have no foundation in the common
law, which held that visitation with extended family was a moral obli-
gation but not a legal right.86  Each of the fifty states has enacted non-
parental—or third party—visitation statutes of some variety.87  The
nationwide enactment of these statutes was due to the states’ recogni-
80 See Baker, supra note 18, at 122 (“Functional relationship does not give rise to R
obligation. . . . .”).
81 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 2.04. R
82 Id. § 2.05 (using the term “individual” throughout instead of “parent”).
83 See Wilson, supra note 71, at 1140 (finding that, of cases that cite to them, four R
percent of majority opinions embrace the Principles, eight percent use them as a start-
ing point for more refined tests, twenty-four percent decline to accept the test for
various reasons, and twenty-four percent use the Principles as support for an outcome
the court would have reached anyway).  For a detailed analysis of each case citing the
Principles and its outcome, see id. at 1135–42 & apps. A–D.
84 See Meyer, supra note 18, at 51 (“No cap is imposed on the number of parents a R
child might have . . . .”); see also supra note 83.
85 See Baker, supra note 18, at 130 (“[T]he Principles also endorse an expanded R
view of state power.  The state has the right to protect a child’s emotional well-being
by ensuring the continuation of certain relationships even if the custodial parent(s)
want to end or diminish the strength of those relationships.  With this expansion of
state power comes a diminishment of negative parental rights—that is, the right to be
free of state interference in the parent-child relationship.” (footnote omitted)).
86 See Natalie Reed, Note, Third-Party Visitation Statutes: Why Are Some Families More
Equal than Others?, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (2005).
87 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3104 (West 2004 & Supp. 2013) (addressing
rights of grandparents); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011)
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tion of the “changing realities of the American family” and the idea
that “children should have the opportunity to benefit from relation-
ships with statutorily specified persons.”88  Grandparents and other
relatives are important figures in the lives of most children, and
“[b]ecause grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a
parental nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the
welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those
children form with such third parties.”89  Unlike doctrines such as de
facto parenthood and parenthood by estoppel, third party visitation
statutes award visitation rights but do not give the party any new spe-
cial status as a parental equivalent, leaving the third party with some-
thing more like a “second-tier status.”90
However, the provision of visitation rights must be balanced
against the rights of the parents, as the Court in Troxel v. Granville
ultimately found.91  In that case, where the State of Washington had
passed a law permitting “any person” to petition a court for visitation
rights “at any time,” and authorized that court to grant the visitation
rights whenever visitation “may serve the best interest of the child,”92
the Court found that the statute “unconstitutionally infringe[d] on
that fundamental parental right.”93  The “breathtakingly broad”94 stat-
ute failed because it allowed Washington trial courts to bypass the
Parham presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his
or her child.95  One might hope that parents will always seek to main-
tain relationships between their children and those adults with whom
their children might have a unique bond, but continuing such rela-
tionships is not always beneficial and absent extraordinary circum-
stances it is generally presumed that a parent will make parenting
(addressing rights of grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 72 (McKinney 2012) (addressing rights of grandparents).
88 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (plurality opinion); see Susan
Tomaine, Comment, Troxel v. Granville: Protecting Fundamental Parental Rights While
Recognizing Changes in the American Family, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 731, 744–48 (2001)
(describing the response of the United States Congress and President Clinton to
increased lobbying by grandparent groups in the 1980s and 1990s).
89 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64.
90 Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and
Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV. 927, 951–52 (2009).
91 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64; see supra Part I.A.
92 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
93 Id. at 67.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 69; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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decisions in light of what is best for his or her child.96  In the wake of
Troxel most state visitation statutes define limited circumstances in
which third parties (generally grandparents) have standing to petition
the court for visitation and articulate specific standards to guide
judges’ determinations.97
The doctrines described in this section allow courts to provide
adults other than biological parents with parental rights and responsi-
bilities.  The doctrines, as laid out here, are meant to represent these
concepts generally, though they have taken slightly different forms in
each state that has employed them.
D. The Best Interests of the Child Standard
  Unlike the doctrines just discussed, the best interests of the child
standard is not a doctrine providing that courts should find that cer-
tain adults are parents who have parental rights.  Rather, it is a stan-
dard used by courts for over thirty years to resolve custody disputes
between existing warring parents who cannot agree on what should be
done about their children.98
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act suggests that courts con-
sider five factors in determining a child’s best interests:
(1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his par-
ent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may signifi-
cantly affect the child’s best interest;
(4) the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community;
and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.99
96 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (“In an ideal world, parents might always seek to
cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren.  Needless to say,
however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an
intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the par-
ent to make in the first instance.”).
97 See Tomaine, supra note 88, at 741–43; see also Lauren Worsek, Note, It Really R
Does Take a Village: Recognizing the Total Caregiving Network by Moving Toward a Func-
tional Perspective in Family Law After Troxel v. Granville, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 589,
601–08 (2009) (surveying the current state of third-party visitation statutes nationwide
after Troxel).
98 See Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child
Standard as an Imperfect but Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 449, 450 (2005).
99 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1973).
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The Act further suggests that courts should not consider “conduct of a
proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child”
when making their decision as to custody.100
The best interests standard developed against a historical back-
drop when judges preferred to award custody to mothers under the
“tender years doctrine,” assuming that mothers were more nurturing
in nature and therefore better suited to the care and rearing of young
children.101  The best interests standard is therefore a movement away
from presumptions in favor of a particular sex and a movement
toward considering the particular facts and circumstances of each
child’s situation.  Scholars have criticized the best interests standard,
largely because of its indeterminacy, potential for abuse by a biased
factfinder, and reliance on expert testimony.102
In response to some of these criticisms, scholars, psychologists,
and social scientists have proposed alternatives to the best interests
standard, though these alternate proposals have not been adopted as
widely by courts.  In the Principles, the ALI suggested that courts adopt
a preference for awarding custody based on an approximation of the
past allocation of parenting responsibilities.103  So, in cases of married
parents, the allocation of custody time post-divorce would roughly
approximate the allocation of time pre-divorce.  West Virginia and
Minnesota both adopted a “primary caretaker” standard, which would
award sole custody to whichever parent had been the child’s primary
caretaker.104  Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit suggested the “least detri-
100 Id.; see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011)
(including consideration of past instances of violence and abuse as well as the “will-
ingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing
relationship between the other parent and the child”).
101 See Peskind, supra note 98, at 453–54.  Before this, until the late nineteenth R
century, English law mandated that children be automatically placed with their father
in the event of a custody dispute. Id. at 452.
102 See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, at 2; Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: R
Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin,
Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. CONTEMP.
PROBS. 226, 226–27 (1975); Peskind, supra note 98, at 459–60. R
103 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 2.08.  The ALI’s rule is not a pure primary
caretaker rule, which would give sole custody to the primary caretaker moving
forward.
104 See W. VA. CODE § 48-9-101 (2012).  Minnesota ultimately rejected a primary
caretaker presumption as the only factor to consider in custody determinations, possi-
bly due in part to an explosion of litigation following institution of the regime, and
also because the standard generally resulted in disguised biases in favor of women.
See Peskind, supra note 98, at 468–70; see also Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best
Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s
Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 448
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mental . . . alternative” standard, which promotes a more realistic
assessment of the situation and prioritizes the child’s psychological
development.105  Critics of this standard note that it provides no more
determinacy than the best interests standard, and further encourages
negative litigation where each parent tries to highlight the flaws of the
other.106  Finally, legislators tend to favor presumptions toward joint
custody (not necessarily equal custody) in custody determinations
absent evidence that joint custody would be detrimental to the
child.107
E. Child Support
  As a part of their duty to care for their children, parents must pro-
vide them with support.108  The legal concept of a parent’s child sup-
port obligations dates back to the Elizabethan Poor Laws in England,
as well as the writings of John Locke and Jeremy Bentham.109  Early
American courts awarded child support that reflected the family’s
income and prior standard of living; however, these awards were only
available for applicants who were dependent and without fault.110  In
the 1980s, Congress mandated the development of numerical child
(1990) (noting that although the primary caretaker standard is facially neutral, it
favors mothers).
105 See Peskind, supra note 98, at 470–71 (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53–64 (1973)).
106 See id. at 471.
107 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(4) (2006) (“[A]bsent a preponderance of
the evidence to the contrary, there shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the
best interests of a minor child or children.”).  Oregon, for example, presumes that
joint custody is preferable only when “both parents agree to the terms and conditions
of the order.” OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(3) (2011).
It is important to note that custody of a child can be divided into physical custody
and legal custody.  Legal custody involves the “right and obligation to make long
range decisions involving education, religious training, discipline, medical care, and
other matters of major significance concerning the child’s life and welfare.”  McCarty
v. McCarty, 807 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).  Physical custody involves
the “right and obligation to provide a home for the child and to make the day-to-day
decisions required during the time the child is actually with the parent having such
custody.” Id.  Depending on the parties’ particular circumstances, a court might
award joint legal custody but sole physical custody, or vice versa. Id. at 1211 (award-
ing joint legal custody to the mother and father but sole physical custody to the
mother).
108 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
109 Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Paren-
tal Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 48, 76, 81 (1998).
110 Id. at 51–52.  Child support still remains ideologically connected to public
assistance law. Id. at 57.
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support guidelines to be calculated as each state saw fit.111  State for-
mulations can be categorized into two types: percentage-of-obligor-
income formulas and income-share formulas.112
Child support is meant to provide for the welfare of the child and
to maintain the child’s new standard of living as close to the marital
standard of living as possible.  But regardless of which formula is used,
custodial parents, and consequently their children, generally end up
with a standard of living below that of the marital household.  Given
the nature of finite resources and the fact that the same incomes are
used to support two households instead of one, child support guide-
lines cannot ensure that children will always be provided for—
“[c]hildren who were poor before family dissolution (or nonforma-
tion) will remain poor.”113  Professor Marsha Garrison argues that the
child support models of the fifty states reflect principles of personal
autonomy, as a parent is thought to be entitled to his or her own
income except to the extent that he or she is unavoidably obligated to
the child.114  For that reason, child support has traditionally been lim-
ited to the child’s two legal parents.
This Part has described the constitutional framework surround-
ing issues of parenthood and some of the ways—both traditional and
novel—that courts have given parental rights and responsibilities to
those other than a child’s biological parents.  The remainder of this
Note examines how Senator Leno’s Bill makes use of these doctrines
as well as how various jurisdictions cited by Senator Leno for support
employ them.
II. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE UTILIZATION OF THESE DOCTRINES
IN VARIOUS STATES
  With various doctrines providing rights and responsibilities to non-
parents in mind, this Part discusses how these doctrines have been
111 Id. at 57.
112 Id. at 60–61.  Professor Garrison argues that both of these approaches can be
thought of as “continuity-of-expenditure” models, as opposed to “equal-outcomes,”
“utilitarian,” and “minimum-income” approaches, which no state has adopted. Id. at
59.  In the “percentage-of-obligor-income” formula, the amount is derived from a cal-
culation of the income of the obligor, the number of children to be supported, and
typical expenditure patterns of intact families. Id. at 60.  The “income-shares”
formula also considers the number of children to be supported, along with the
incomes of both parents and particular child care costs incurred by the custodial par-
ent. Id. at 61.  Child support awards can vary further due to parental negotiation. Id.
at 64.
113 Id. at 65; see also id. at 117.
114 Id. at 70, 86–89.
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applied to families in the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maine, and
Pennsylvania.  To be sure, these doctrines have been taken up, evalu-
ated, and employed in various ways by other states as well, but this
Note focuses specifically on California and the jurisdictions cited by
Senator Leno in support of his Bill.
A. The District of Columbia
  In 2007, the District of Columbia took the first step toward multiple
parenthood when it allowed de facto parents to seek custody.115  The
need for development of legal doctrines giving parental rights to
adults other than a child’s biological parents was likely acutely felt in
the District, where the percentage of multigenerational households is
significantly above the national level.116  One must meet either of two
sets of criteria to be a “de facto parent” in the District of Columbia:
either (i) the individual must have lived with the child at the time of
the child’s birth or adoption or (ii) have lived with the child for at
least ten of the twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint and have formed a “strong emotional bond . . . with the
encouragement and intent of the child’s parent that a parent-child
relationship form” between them.117  In either case, the individual
must have “taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s
parent” and “held [himself or herself] out as the child’s parent . . . or,
if there are 2 parents, both parents.”118  Notably, by definition there
can be at least one de facto parent in addition to two parents.119  De
facto parents can seek custody and are otherwise treated as parents.120
This statute blends concepts of de facto parenthood and
parenthood by estoppel and further makes the status more easily
115 D.C. CODE §§ 16-831.01; 16-831.03 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2012); see supra
Part I.C.3.
116 Nationally, 5.6% of households are multigenerational, meaning the family
household contains three or more generations.  Daphne A. Lofquist, Multigenerational
Households: 2009–2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1, 1 (Oct. 2012).  In the District of
Columbia, an estimated 7.1% of households are multigenerational. Id. at 3 tbl.1.  In
many multigenerational homes, grandparents take an active role in raising their
grandchildren. GrandFacts, AARP, http://www.aarp.org/relationships/friends-fam-
ily/grandfacts-sheets/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
117 §§ 16-831.01(1)(B)(ii)–(iii).
118 Id. §§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(ii)–(iii).
119 It is important to note that the District of Columbia further allows third parties
(i.e., non-parents that do not qualify as de facto parents) to seek custody of a child as
well so long as the “primary” parent consents to the motion. Id. § 16-
831.02(a)(1)(A).
120 Id. § 16-831.03.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 21 22-APR-13 11:11
2013] too  many  cooks  in  the  kitchen? 2043
attainable than the standard suggested in the Principles.121  The Dis-
trict of Columbia’s standard lessens the amount of time that one must
live with a child before attaining de facto parenthood status from two
years to ten months, but raises the threshold commitment from the
individual from performing as many caretaking functions as the custo-
dial parent to assuming full and complete responsibilities.122  Unlike
the standard in the Principles, the District of Columbia requires that a
child have a strong, emotional, parent-like relationship with the child
encouraged by the custodial parent.123  Like the doctrine of
parenthood by estoppel, the District of Columbia requires that the
adult hold himself or herself out as the child’s parent, rather than
simply assume responsibilities and develop a close relationship.124
Unlike the ALI’s de facto parenthood proposal, but similar to the
parenthood by estoppel proposal, de facto parents in the District of
Columbia can seek full custody of the child to the exclusion of other
parents.125
B. Delaware
  Delaware originally recognized two kinds of parent-child relation-
ships: the mother-child relationship and the father-child relationship.
These relationships could be formed by giving birth to a child, by
adjudication, by adoption, or by an un-rebutted presumption.126  In
2009, Delaware added another kind of parent-child relationship to its
statutory scheme: the de facto parent-child relationship.  This rela-
tionship is (legally) formed by a court’s determination that a man or
woman is a de facto parent of the child.127  De facto parent status is
attained if one “[h]as had the support and consent of the child’s par-
ent or parents who fostered the formation and establishment of a par-
ent-like relationship between the child and the de facto parent,”
exercises parental responsibility for the child, and acts in a parental
role for enough time to establish “a bonded and dependent relation-
121 See supra Part I.C.3.
122 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 69, 79 and accompanying text.
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2009).
127 Id. §§ 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6).  Like the Bill in California proposed by Senator
Leno, see infra Part III.B, this legislation came about in direct response to a case in
which a lesbian woman was denied joint custody of a child that only her partner had
adopted. See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 1 (Del. 2009); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother
Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in
the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 223–25 (2009).
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ship with the child that is parental in nature.”128  The adults seeking
parental status need not have any particular kind of relationship with
the existing legal parents.129
Delaware’s de facto parent statute authorizes a court to find three
or more parents of a child, and support by at least one of the child’s
existing parents is necessary for attainment of the de facto status.  In
Delaware, by attaining de facto parent status one attains all of the
rights, privileges, and liabilities heretofore reserved for natural par-
ents.  The required showing to become a de facto parent in Delaware
is significantly lower than it is in the Principles.  Delaware does not
require that the adult live with the child for any minimum amount of
time or demand a demonstration of any minimum amount of parental
responsibility.130  However, unlike the Principles, Delaware requires
that the adult have a unique and bonded relationship with the
child.131
This statute has been held unconstitutional by at least one Dela-
ware court.  In Bancroft v. Jameson, decided in 2010, a family court held
that the de facto parent statute was overbroad and therefore violated
the biological parents’ constitutional rights.132  The court found that
Delaware’s de facto parent statute “sounds the alarm of the caveat
expressed by United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, when she said in Troxel, the question places ‘a substantial
burden on the traditional parent-child relationship . . . and can pre-
sent questions of constitutional import.’”133  The court held that even
though other Delaware courts had accepted the theory of de facto
parenthood in order to protect the best interests of child, the codified
Delaware statute was unconstitutional.134  The decision has not been
appealed.
C. Maine
  In 2004 in Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court (Maine’s highest
court) recognized that de facto parents could, in particular circum-
128 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009).
129 As in, they need not have been that parent’s partner or relative per se in order
to qualify. See William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto Parenthood, 36 J. LEGIS.
263, 264 (2010) (outlining the foundations of de facto parenthood).
130 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 71, 75 and accompanying text.
132 Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010).
133 Id. at 740 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64–65 (2000) (plurality
opinion)).
134 Id. at 748–50.
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stances, be awarded certain parental rights and responsibilities.135  In
C.E.W. v. D.E.W.,136 two lesbian women “agreed that D.E.W. would
conceive a child using artificial insemination.”137  After the child was
born, and then again after they split up, both women signed parent-
ing agreements “detailing their intention to maintain equal parental
rights and responsibilities for the child.”138  The parties stipulated that
the non-biological mother was a de facto parent, but disagreed as to
what rights and responsibilities could be awarded to such a person.139
The court held that it could, “in limited circumstances, entertain an
award of parental rights and responsibilities to a de facto parent based
on a determination of the child’s best interest.”140  However, given
that the parties stipulated C.E.W.’s status as a de facto parent, the
court did not “address the separate and more fundamental question
of by what standard the determination of de facto parenthood should
be made” and noted the weighty liberty interests of natural and adop-
tive parents that would be implicated by determinations of de facto
parenthood.141  The hesitant tone characterizing the decision betrays
the court’s unwillingness to embrace wholesale the doctrine of de
facto parenthood.  Though others have characterized this case as rec-
ognizing de facto parents and third party parents by extension,142 the
court only does so reluctantly, and because the parties had already
stipulated to one’s de facto parent status.  It is important to note that
this has been the only court so far to award the full range of parental
rights envisioned by the ALI,143 and it did so reluctantly, noting specif-
ically that it did not intend to officially adopt the ALI’s standards.144
135 C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004).
136 845 A.2d 1146.
137 Id. at 1147.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1148, 1151.
140 Id. at 1151.
141 See id. at 1151–52.
142 See Senate Bill 1476 May 8 Analysis, supra note 21, at 2–3.
143 Wilson, supra note 71, at 1143.  Generally other courts awarding the same
rights have reasoned that the award must serve the child’s best interests or have
applied other, more robust, tests. Id.; see supra note 83; see also Wilson, supra note 71,
at 1144–58 (discussing courts that, based on the Principles, award full rights, require
an additional showing of best interests, require proof of harm, place greater weight
on the custodial parent’s right to decide, reject the ALI’s approach, and circumscribe
the approach).
144 C.E.W., 845 A.2d at 1152 n.13.
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D. Pennsylvania
  In a still more dramatic ruling in 2007, a Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania (the state’s intermediate appellate court) ruled that three
individuals had obligations to support a child and that all three were
further entitled to at least partial custody.  In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob,145
Jodilynn and Jennifer entered into a civil union and lived together for
approximately nine years.146  During that time, Jodilynn adopted two
of her nephews and had two children by her long-time friend Carl,
who agreed to act as her sperm donor.147  Carl remained involved in
the children’s lives from the time they were born.148  In a custody
action the Superior Court affirmed an award of shared legal custody
of all four children to Jodilynn, Jennifer, and Carl.149  Jennifer
received primary physical custody of one of the children with visita-
tion by Jodilynn, Jodilynn was awarded primary physical custody of the
other three children with visitation by Jennifer, and Carl was awarded
partial physical custody of one weekend a month with his biological
children.150  The court determined that Jennifer had in loco parentis
status, which gave her the opportunity to prove that her relationship
with the children should be maintained over the natural parents’
objections, but that the status did not “elevate a third party to parity
with a natural parent in determining the merits of [a] custody dis-
pute.”151  Despite the fact that everyone—including Carl—originally
thought of Carl as a mere sperm donor, the court found that he was a
biological parent who had exercised rights appurtenant to that status
and could not avoid financial responsibility for his two children.152
The trial court in this case had refused to hold Carl liable for child
support in addition to Jodilynn and Jennifer because that would have
created an “untenable situation[ ] never having been anticipated by
Pennsylvania law.”153  The Superior Court did not see such a concern
as problematic and held that, “in the absence of legislative mandates,
the courts must construct a fair, workable[,] and responsible basis for
the protection of children.”154
145 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
146 Id. at 476.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 477.
152 Id. at 480.
153 Id. at 482.
154 Id.
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In its attempt at a “fair, workable[,] and responsible” response to
the situation before it, the Superior Court utilized the doctrine of in
loco parentis instead of finding that all three were parents outright and
did not find that an adult with in loco parentis status had the same
standing in a custody dispute as legal parents.  The novelty of this case
is twofold: the Superior Court essentially disregarded the intent of the
parties, finding that Carl—not Jennifer—was the other legal parent,
and the court was willing to demand child support from Jennifer—the
in loco parentis individual—in addition to two legal parents (Carl and
Jodilynn).  In this way the Pennsylvania court extended the concept of
child support even further than did the ALI, which had not suggested
requiring support from parents by estoppel when two parents were
already responsible, or from de facto parents in any case.155  The case
was not appealed.
While it is true that the two statutes in the District of Columbia
and Delaware and the two cases from Maine and Pennsylvania have
employed doctrines in family law in slightly progressive ways, they
have not all been as well-received as Senator Leno might like to sug-
gest.  In fact, one of the cited statutes has since been found
unconstitutional.156
III. PRESUMPTIONS, PARENTHOOD, AND THE STATUS
OF CHILDREN IN CALIFORNIA
  Part III focuses on how California courts have used these doctrines
and the potential impact of Senator Leno’s proposed Bill on Califor-
nia law.  Supporters of the Bill claim that it is a natural extension of
the movements in the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maine, and
Pennsylvania,157 but as this Part will show, these supporters overstate
the similarities between these other measures and Senate Bill 1476.
A. California’s Presumptions of Parenthood and Their Inherent Tensions
as Exemplified in In re M.C.
  California largely adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) in
1994.158  The “parent and child relationship” is defined as “the legal
relationship existing between a child and the child’s natural or adop-
155 See supra notes 70, 80 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.D (discussing
child support standards).
156 See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.  However, the statute is still R
technically in effect, as the so-holding court was only a family court.
157 See Senate Bill 1476 May 8 Analysis, supra note 21, at 2–3. R
158 Part 3 of California’s Family Code begins: “[t]his part may be cited as the Uni-
form Parentage Act.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 7600 (West 2012).
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tive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privi-
leges, duties, and obligations,” and includes both the mother and
child and the father and child relationships.159  Like the UPA, the Cal-
ifornia Family Code provides that a parent and child relationship can
be established by proof of a woman’s having given birth, proof of
adoption, or by certain rebuttable presumptions.160  A man is pre-
sumed to be the father of a child if he was married to the mother and
the child was born during the marriage or immediately after the end
of the marriage.161  The presumption exists if he married the mother
after the birth of the child and was named on the child’s birth certifi-
cate or is already obligated to provide support for the child (per judi-
cial decree), or if “[h]e receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child.”162  Unlike the UPA, no gen-
der-neutral provisions that apply determinations of paternity to deter-
minations of maternity exist in the California Family Code; however,
this principle has developed in California case law.163
Presumptions are on the whole very useful and efficient things,164
yet given their inherently inconclusive, rebuttable nature, sometimes
they conflict, especially under gender-neutral readings of these stat-
utes.  California anticipated the possibility of such conflict in Section
7612, which provides that if two or more presumptions arise that con-
flict with each other, “the presumption which on the facts is founded
on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”165  The
California legislature has never explained which considerations of pol-
icy and logic are the weightiest and should control.
This tension in the law came to a head in California in the case of
In re M.C.166  In June of 2008, a woman named Melissa V. became
pregnant with M.C. during a brief relationship with a man named
Jesus Perez.167  Jesus was supportive of Melissa and invited her to live
with him and his family, which she did for the first few months of her
pregnancy.168  When she was just a few months pregnant, Melissa
moved out of Jesus’ home and reconciled with her registered domes-
tic partner Irene V., with whom she had had a falling out shortly
159 Id. § 7601.
160 Id. § 7610.
161 Id. § 7611(a)–(b).
162 Id. § 7611(c)–(d).
163 See In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
164 See supra Part I.B.
165 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2012).
166 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856.
167 Id. at 861.
168 Id.
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before becoming involved with Jesus.169  From its beginning two years
before, Melissa and Irene’s relationship was marked with physical and
verbal abuse (due in part to Melissa’s mental illness and drug and
alcohol abuse),170 but in October of 2008, Melissa and Irene mar-
ried.171  When M.C. was born in March of 2009 she was given the sur-
names of both Melissa and Irene,172 and the three of them lived
together for about three to four weeks before Melissa and M.C. moved
out.173  In May Irene filed a request for custody and visitation seeking
joint legal and physical custody of M.C.174  In September M.C. was
taken into protective custody after Melissa’s new boyfriend, Jose A.,
stabbed Irene in the neck and back in an attempt to scare her away
from pursuing custody of M.C., presumably with Melissa’s encourage-
ment.175  Meanwhile, Jesus, who had not been provided any contact
information by Melissa when she left, moved to Oklahoma for
work.176  When Melissa reached out to him in June of 2009 asking for
financial assistance, he sent her money a few times and connected her
with his family in California, who visited with Melissa and M.C.
regularly.177
After a stint in foster care resulting from some of Melissa’s sub-
stance abuse problems, M.C. was temporarily placed with Melissa’s
parents while the California Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices (“DCFS”) brought a dependency action.178  After a two-day hear-
ing, the juvenile court found Melissa to be M.C.’s biological mother,
Jesus to be M.C.’s presumed father, and Irene to be M.C.’s presumed
mother, and all three were granted reunification services.179  On
appeal, the court agreed with the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but
held that only two parties could claim legal status as parents.180  The
court remanded the matter and instructed the juvenile court to
169 Id. at 861–62.
170 Id. at 861.
171 Id. at 862.  Melissa and Irene married in California during the period of time
when same-sex marriage was legal there. Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 862–63.
176 Id. at 862.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 861, 866.
179 Id. at 866.  These services include access to state-sponsored programs designed
to help adults be better parents.  Often, parents are required by courts to participate
in these programs and risk being found unfit or losing some or their rights if they do
not.
180 Id. at 876.
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resolve the conflicting presumptions in light of section 7612 of Cali-
fornia’s Family Code,181 which stipulates that “[i]f two or more pre-
sumptions arise . . . [that] conflict with each other, the presumption
which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of pol-
icy and logic controls.”182  While the appeals court “empathize[d]
with the desire to leave all options open,” it noted that the California
Supreme Court has continued “to reject the notion of dual paternity
or maternity where its recognition would result in three parents.”183
B. Senate Bill 1476
  California State Senator Mark Leno introduced Senate Bill 1476 on
February 24, 2012,184 less than a year after the decision in In re M.C.185
The story of M.C.’s traumatic first two years of life inspired Leno to
draft a bill that would give courts the authority to find that children
like M.C. could, in situations of conflicting presumptions, have more
than two parents, if such a finding would be required to protect the
best interests of the child.186
With only a few small changes to the existing law, Senate Bill 1476
(“the Bill”) would have fundamentally altered California’s Family
Code by pushing the concept of legal parenthood further away from
the traditional model of one father and one mother and their biologi-
cal children than ever before in the United States.187  The Bill would
have broadened the traditional use of the best interests analysis in a
way that radically expands judicial discretion.  Section 7612(b), which
currently provides that if two or more presumptions or claims of
181 Id. at 877.
182 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2012).  The court noted that § 7612(a) pro-
vides that certain presumptions are rebuttable “in an appropriate action only by clear
and convincing evidence,” meaning that these presumptions are not always rebutta-
ble. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 876 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(a)).  Appropri-
ate actions include those in which “another candidate is vying for parental rights” and
seeks to rebut another candidate’s status as a presumed parent. In re Nicholas H., 46
P.3d 932, 941 (Cal. 2002).  If there is no clear and convincing evidence that a candi-
date is unfit to retain their status, the analysis proceeds under section 7612(b). In re
M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 876–77.  As of that time the court had not found that any of
the three were unfit to be parents. Id.
183 In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877 (citing Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d
660, 666 (Cal. 2005)).
184 Senate Bill 1476, supra note 20.  This Bill was vetoed by Governor Edmund G. R
Brown, Jr., on September 30, 2012. Senate Bill 1476 Veto Message, supra note 23.
185 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856.
186 Senate Bill 1476 May 8 Analysis, supra note 21, at 3. R
187 Discussion of international legal systems recognizing family structures of more
than two parents is beyond the scope of this Note.
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parenthood arise that conflict with each other, “the presumption
which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of pol-
icy and logic controls,”188 would have been undercut by an additional
sentence providing that a court could “[i]n an appropriate action . . .
find that a child has more than two natural or adoptive parents if
required to serve the best interest of the child.”189  Section 3040, which deter-
mines the order of preference that a court should consider before
awarding custody,190 would have been modified to allow the court to
allocate custody and visitation among more than two parents if such a
determination would be in the best interests of the child.191  The Bill
would also expand the class of people owing child support.  A pro-
posed modification to Section 4052.5 instructed courts to divide child
support obligations among the parents based on their respective
incomes and the amount of time they spend with the child.192  Ulti-
mately, and most importantly, the Bill would have authorized a court
to determine that a child has a parent-child relationship with more
than two adults.193
1. Analysis of the Bill’s Application of the Best Interests Standard
  In California, as elsewhere, the best interests standard comes into
play in proceedings for the legal separation of married parents and
other actions to determine custody between parents who were not
married.194  But Senator Leno’s Bill brings the best interests standard
into an additional context: in determinations of who a child’s parents
actually are.195  Employing the best interests standard in determina-
tions of custody and visitation is a reasonable application of the stan-
188 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2012).
189 Senate Bill 1476, supra note 20, § 55 (emphasis added).  This amendment fur- R
ther would have instructed the court to consider several additional factors in deter-
mining the child’s best interest under that section. Id.
190 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040.
191 Senate Bill 1476, supra note 20, § 5.  The Bill would have specifically directed R
the court to consider stability for the child among other best interests factors and
provided that not all parents need necessarily share legal or physical custody of the
child. Id.
192 Id. § 2.  Specifically, the Bill provided that, absent special circumstances, the
statewide uniform guideline should apply, and that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to require reprogramming of the California Child Support Automation Sys-
tem . . . , [or] a change to the statewide uniform guideline for determining child
support.” Id.
193 Id.
194 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3021.
195 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. R
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dard, and indeed precisely what the standard was developed for;196
the application is unusual only in that the court would have three or
more parties to evaluate rather than just two.
Senator Leno’s attempt to bring the best interests standard into
determinations of parenthood betrays a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of the doctrine.  The best interests standard and competing pro-
posals such as the primary caretaker standard, the least detrimental
alternative standard, and joint custody all endeavor to sort out what
arrangement should be developed to provide for a child whose par-
ents, because of a break-up or other custody dispute, can no longer
live together with the child.197  No other jurisdiction or model has
suggested using the best interests standard to determine who a child’s
parents are, not even Delaware or the District of Columbia.198
Determinations of parenthood no longer depend solely on the
basis of biology, but biology still remains a substantial factor in the
determination.199  Generally, adults other than biological parents are
not determined to be a child’s legal parents unless a sperm or egg
donor is involved, the child was adopted by only one parent who was
in a relationship with another person, there is no known biological
parent, or that parent has repudiated the child or otherwise failed to
grasp his or her status.200  The Supreme Court has yet to define
parenthood in terms of one’s functional status alone, and only two
states have codified functional parenthood.201  Intent to bring a child
into being comes into play in determinations of parenthood only in
rare cases.202
196 See supra Part I.D.
197 Id.
198 But see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1203(A) (2007) (providing that, in the case of a
second parent adoption, if the non-custodial parent refuses to give consent to the
adoption (or, refuses to allow their parental rights to be terminated), a court may
grant the petition and terminate parental rights without the non-custodial parent’s
consent if the evidence shows that consent “is withheld contrary to the best interests
of the child”).
199 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 14–15, 17, 33 and accompanying text.
201 See supra Parts II.A–B.  D.C. and Delaware have codified functional parenthood
in addition to and not to the exclusion of biological parenthood and traditional pre-
sumptions of parenthood.  Case law in Maine and Pennsylvania supports movement
toward parenthood as defined by one’s functional status. See supra Parts II.C–D.
202 See supra notes 14–15, 17 and accompanying text; cf. supra Part II.C (discussing
C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004), where the court found that the natural
mother’s lesbian partner’s intent to be a legal parent was not dispositive where the
sperm donor remained involved in the child’s life, and finding instead that the part-
ner had in loco parentis standing).
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Movement away from objective markers to determine paternity
and maternity toward flexible standards like the best interests stan-
dard leads to increased judicial discretion, which may result in abuse
of that discretion.  If the best interests standard was used to resolve
conflicting presumptions, then courts would be welcome to find, for
example, that wealthy, privileged, and stable individuals are a child’s
parents and responsible for the child’s care and upbringing rather
than other less well off, less stable vying adults.  The discretion to find
that a minor is the child of one party rather than another on the basis
of the best interests standard invites judicial abuse, as judges would
inevitably bring their own biases to bear in determinations and could
pick the person that they think would do a better job parenting—in
violation of the concept of fundamental parental rights.203
Senator Leno’s Bill welcomes determinations that a child has
more than two parents, yet specifically provides that not all parents
must be awarded custody and visitation.204  Traditionally, a parent is
only completely denied visitation if they are unfit or if they have given
up their rights to the child.205  Under this provision, a judge could
deny a parent custody and visitation with the reasoning that shuffling
the child between three or more homes would foreclose necessary sta-
bility for the child.206  An overtly or subconsciously biased judge could
enlarge the circle of parents to include adults that the judge might
want to be involved in the child’s life by failing to resolve conflicting
presumptions.  Then, using the best interests standard, the judge
could shrink the circle of parents with whom the child is permitted
contact under the guise of seeking stability for the child, in reality
203 See Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 741 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (noting that
one of the “trio of sacred rules” regarding parents is that the parental right “is not to
be abrogated where a non-parent is able to provide an easier or more luxurious life”).
Of course, judges making custody determinations regularly rely on their own sense of
which parent would do a better job in making their decisions.  However, custody
determinations stand in stark contrast with determinations of parenthood, as determi-
nations of parenthood are largely final while custody determinations are subject to
change as the parties’ situations change. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54
(1982) (discussing the fundamental liberty interest of parents at stake in termination
of parental rights proceedings arising from the permanency of threatened loss).
204 Senate Bill 1476, supra note 20, § 1. R
205 Indeed, in that case their rights could be terminated.
206 Senate Bill 1476, supra note 20, § 1 (“In cases where a child has more than two R
legal parents, the court shall allocate custody and visitation among the parents based
on the best interest of the child, including, but not limited to, stability for the child.
This may mean that not all parents share legal or physical custody of the child.”).
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preventing contact between the child and those adults that the judge
disfavors for whatever reason.207
In a fundamental way, applying the best interests standard to
determinations of parenthood rather than adjudications between par-
ents rejects the Parham presumption that the “natural bonds of affec-
tion lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”208
There is “normally . . . no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that par-
ent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s
children.”209  Parents are presumed, under Parham, to make decisions
in their child’s best interests largely because of their “natural” (or bio-
logical) bonds of affection.  Under the Bill, the judge would be able to
determine which adults are in the child’s best interests to have as par-
ents, a determination much more invasive than deciding which adults
should remain in the child’s life under third-party visitation statutes.
American family law operates under the assumption that the parent,
and not the judge, knows what is in the child’s best interests.  The
judge is only called upon to wrestle with the question of what is in the
best interest of the child when the parents themselves cannot agree
and choose to seek a judicial determination or when the parties are
unfit, not to determine who parents are.
2. Analysis of the Bill’s Impact on Child Support
  Senator Leno’s desire to make sure that children are provided for is
commendable, but making as many adults liable for the well-being of
a child as possible is a policy decision that has been considered and
rejected consistently over the course of American family law.  Califor-
nia’s child support formula follows the “income-share” formula, con-
sidering the parents’ total income, the number of children, and the
207 In the event that a judge actively seeks to find that another adult is a parent in
order to avoid awarding parental rights and responsibilities to a parent that the judge
is displeased with for whatever reason, as suggested about the judge in In re M.C. by
Professor Polikoff, Nancy D. Polikoff, Response: And Baby Makes . . . How Many?  Using
In re M.C. to Consider Parentage of a Child Conceived Through Sexual Intercourse and Born
to a Lesbian Couple, 100 GEO. L.J. 2015, 2049 (2012), other avenues exist through the
juvenile welfare system for removing a child from the home of an abusive or neglect-
ful adult.  Short of behavior warranting a finding of unfitness, however, the judge
must defer to the judgment of the parent under the Parham presumption.  Multiple-
parent legislation enacted for the purpose of allowing judges to behave as such would
be an inappropriate grant of power to family judges.
208 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (emphasis added); see supra note 28
and accompanying text.
209 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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amount of time that the children spend with each party.210  Courts are
to implement these guidelines, keeping in mind that parents’ princi-
pal obligations include supporting their minor child and that the
interests of the child should remain the court’s top priority.211  While
spreading the burden of providing support for a child between three
or more parents would typically mean that more money is making its
way to the child and the child might be kept from relying on state
resources,212 the goal of child support has never been simply to keep a
child from being poor.213  Such a motivation would be reason to find
even extended family members liable for support, but historically
child support has been limited to a child’s two parents out of respect
for the family’s autonomy and the autonomy of the earning parent.214
The Pennsylvania court in Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob215 was anomalous in its
finding that an adult with in loco parentis standing was responsible for
supporting the child in addition to two legal parents.216  The desire to
provide the maximum possible material support for a child should not
motivate a court or legislature to change the nature of parenthood by
recognizing more than two parents.  Of course, if a court were author-
ized to find more than two parents, then it would be reasonable for a
court to enlarge the class of those responsible for the child to corre-
spond with the class of those enjoying parental rights.217
210 CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West 2004).
211 Id. § 4053.
212 See Senate Bill 1476 May 8 Analysis, supra note 21, at 7 (“Recognizing these fami- R
lies can also reduce the state’s financial responsibility for the child because all parents
have the obligation to support the child.  In dependency actions, if a child has more
than two parents, legal acknowledgement of more than two of those parents may keep
the child out of foster care by giving the court more options for placement.”).
213 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. R
214 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. But see WIS. STAT. ANN. R
§ 49.90(1)(a)(2) (West 2011) (requiring parents of dependents under the age of
eighteen to maintain the children of those dependents to the extent that the depen-
dent cannot and the (grand)parent is able to).
215 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
216 See supra Part II.D.
217 Notably, as discussed above, in the Principles the ALI does not make de facto
parents and parents by estoppel (when there are already two legal parents) liable for
child support, though they would award parental rights to these parents.  The Princi-
ples contains no explanation of why it would enlarge the rights of this group of people
without enlarging their corresponding responsibilities. See generally Baker, supra note
18 (discussing the imbalance inherent to the ALI’s proposals).
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3. Analysis of the Bill’s Provision for Multiple (More than Two)
Parents
  The most radical feature of this proposal is that it allows a child in
California to have more than two legal parents by supposing that it
could be in the best interests of a child to have more than two.  In his
attempt to provide avenues for equitable outcomes in cases where pre-
sumptions of parenthood conflict and the adults involved seek judicial
intervention, Senator Leno and his Bill threaten to undercut founda-
tional principles of family law.  The Bill invokes similar principles to
those which characterize the movements in the District of Columbia,
Delaware, Maine, and Pennsylvania, as noted by supporters of the
Bill,218 and is also sympathetic to the Principles, in its bending of the
concept of parenthood in an attempt to pursue equitable outcomes
for children.  Yet it is fundamentally different from these doctrines in
that it approaches multiple parenthood through the avenue of once-
conflicting presumptions rather than through the after-the-fact doc-
trines discussed above that require action (such as participating in
childrearing) or the development of emotional connections.
Despite potential vagueness problems, California’s current
method of resolving conflicting presumptions in favor of the one
“which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of pol-
icy and logic”219 is constitutionally appropriate under the reasoning of
Michael H. v. Gerald D.220  It is constitutionally permissible to deny cer-
tain individuals parental standing in some instances in the further-
ance of some stated policy goal, such as maintaining predictability,
stability, and as much integrity in family units as possible.221  It is
within a state’s prerogative to change these presumptions in a variety
of ways, and allow presumptions to be rebutted with greater or lesser
showings in determination proceedings, but the Supreme Court has
not insinuated that more than two presumptions could appropriately
exist simultaneously.222
218 Senate Bill 1476 May 8 Analysis, supra note 21, at 2–3. R
219 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2004).
220 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
221 See supra notes 34, 54 and accompanying text.
222 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128–29 (1989) (plurality opinion).  Individual Jus-
tices of the Court haven’t foreclosed the possibility that arrangements where a child
maintains parent-like relationships with other adults might be constitutionally permis-
sible; however, this perspective has yet to be affirmed by a majority of the court. See
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86, 88–89 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3 (plurality
opinion) (“Perhaps the concept [of the family unit] can be expanded [beyond the
traditional structure], but it will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected rela-
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The case of In re M.C., which gave rise to the Bill, is worthy of
further analysis.  It is important to note that, there, it was not the case
that Melissa, Irene, and Jesus together intended that Melissa conceive
and that all three would raise M.C.  Rather, at each stage Melissa par-
ticipated in a couple—first she coupled with Irene, an arrangement
she left to couple with Jesus, leaving again to couple with Irene, whom
she left for Jose.223  Melissa sought to raise her child as a single
mother or participate with a single partner in the raising of M.C. at
every step; the trouble in this case comes with the fact that Melissa’s
family structures shifted so quickly that the law could not catch up,
resulting in conflicting presumptions.224
The appropriate remedy in this case, and in others like it, is to
work with equitable doctrines or to tweak existing presumptions in
order to bring about the best outcome, not to change the nature of
parenthood by providing for more than two adults to raise a child
together with all of the legal rights and responsibilities of legal
parenthood.  Doctrines such as in loco parentis, parenthood by estop-
pel, de facto parenthood, and especially third-party visitation provide
platforms for ensuring that in special cases those adults who are not
parents, but who occupy unique and important places in a child’s life,
can retain a legal right to interact with them.
Historically, courts have recognized the right of two parents to
raise their children.  Social perspectives on families have changed sub-
stantially in the last hundred years, but
[a]lthough the concept of parent has expanded from two persons,
male and female, creating a child through their biological union, to
two persons of the same sex creating a child through their commit-
ted intentions and using assisted reproduction, all of these relation-
ships have in common a biological nexus of two parents leading to a
child’s birth.  The two individuals who in every case were involved in
the creation of that child . . . are the only two persons who have
been recognized as a parent to the child.225
Senator Leno’s endeavor to adjust family law to better meet the needs
of California families is commendable and understandable, as family
structures are changing and many families no longer conform to the
traditional heterosexual-married-couple-with-biological-children
tionships—and will thus cease to have any constitutional significance—if it is
stretched so far as to include the relationship established between a married woman,
her lover, and their child . . . .”).
223 See supra notes 166–177 and accompanying text. R
224 In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 871–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
225 Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 749 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010).
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model.226  But changing the nature of parental presumptions and
expanding the number of parents that a child can have should be a
step that is taken, if at all, only after careful deliberation and consider-
ation of constitutional issues involved as well as the impact on Califor-
nia’s children.227  The next Part examines the practical concerns of
multiple parenthood and issues likely to arise that could negatively
impact a child’s development.
IV. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF HAVING MORE THAN
TWO PARENTS ON CHILDREN
  Despite fundamental changes in the last fifty years,228 family units
remain the “essential building blocks” of modern American society.229
State governments and local communities should do everything in
their power to support these family units, but before they do anything
else, courts, legislatures, and interested parties must make sure that
parents are able to effectively raise their children.230
Social scientists, legal scholars, and Supreme Court Justices alike
have all noted that parental autonomy is crucial to the American
familial model.231  Autonomy is directly linked to concepts of author-
ity, which a caregiver needs in order “to do the job to the best of her
226 See Baker, supra note 18, at 141 (“Changes in both social norms and technol-
ogy have altered, fundamentally, how people become and function as parents.  It
defies reality to assume that children will be cared or provided for within the confines
of a binary biological norm.  The binary biological model may still express our ideal
but it does not reflect our world.”); Ian Lovett, Measure Opens Door to Three Parents, or
Four, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/
14/us/a-california-bill-would-legalize-third-and-fourth-parent-adoptions.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0.  Lovett quotes Professor Nancy Polikoff as saying, “[t]his is about
looking at the reality of children’s lives, which are heterogeneous, as opposed to
maintaining a fiction of homogeneity . . . . Families are different from one another.  If
the law will not acknowledge that, then it’s not responding to the needs of children
who do not fit into the one-size-fits-all box.’” Id.
227 See Debra J. Saunders, Leno’s Law: Extra Parent Could Split Baby More Ways,
TOWHHALL.COM, at 2 (Aug. 5, 2012), http://townhall.com/columnists/debraj-
saunders/2012/08/05/lenos_law_extra_parent_could_split_baby_more_ways
(“[L]awmakers should be very humble when they tinker with family law.”); Wilson,
supra note 75, at 92 (“Before any decisionmaker implements the ALI’s proposed treat-
ment of Ex Live-In Partners, they should be convinced that the ALI has met its bur-
den of demonstrating that this creation and enlargement of parental rights would
benefit children more than it would harm them.”).
228 See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text.
229 MARGARET F. BRINIG, FAMILY, LAW, AND COMMUNITY 119 (2010).
230 Id. at 98.
231 Indeed, as Professor Brinig noted, autonomy is one of the primary underlying
reasons for the presumption of paternity and the presumption that parents act with
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or his abilities.”232  Continuously second-guessing and challenging
decisions results in stunted parenting,233 and indeed this need for
authority is the historic justification for preventing judges from med-
dling with parental decisions unless that parent is demonstrably unfit.
Some suggest that parents become more motivated to care for their
children when they can be sure that their decisions will not be inter-
fered with.234
Authority is not just a concept relevant to a parent’s interaction
with the State—parents need authority even in their own family units
in order to foster personal development in their children.235  This
need for parental autonomy underlies the Supreme Court’s decision
in Troxel to prevent extended family members from gaining too big of
a stake in a parent-child relationship.236  A parent’s bond with his or
her child is “central to the lives of both parents and children, is
intense and intimate, and requires privacy to flourish.”237  Children
and families need healthy communities in order to thrive,238 but that
truism does not extend so far as to justify expanding the number of
adults in a child’s nuclear family.239  The vast majority of custodial
parents voluntarily expand their extended family networks to associate
their children with ex-partners, extended family members, and other
enriching adults, and decrease their networks again if they think that
such contact will be detrimental to the child.240  If it is necessary to a
child’s health and well-being to continue to interact with a parent’s
former partner, courts should defer to the parent to make that deci-
sion under the Parham presumption and only interfere if the parent is
their children’s best interests in mind, as well as the reason for demarcating where the
government should refrain from interfering at all. Id. at 122.
232 Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 957, 979 (1999); see also id. at 979–80, 1029 (discussing parents’ need for auton-
omy in order to be effective parents, whether they are biological or adoptive).
233 BRINIG, supra note 229, at 120 (“When others—putative fathers, grandparents, R
well-meaning strangers—cannot second-guess decisions, families can thrive.”).
234 See id. at 118–21; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81
VA. L. REV. 2401, 2430–31, 2450–51 (1995).
235 BRINIG, supra note 229, at 98 (arguing that “[w]hen third parties claim ‘rights,’
they undermine marriages and parenting”).
236 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
237 Scott & Scott, supra note 234, at 2476.
238 BRINIG, supra note 229, at 98; see also Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of R
Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733 (2001) (discussing the ways that communities can
strengthen marriages and families, but also the ways in which communities can inhibit
effective parenting).
239 See BRINIG, supra note 229, at 142 (discussing various studies finding broad kin R
networks problematic).
240 See Wilson, supra note 75, at 98.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 38 22-APR-13 11:11
2060 notre dame law review [vol. 88:4
found to be unfit.  Legislators and courts should not expand the class
of parents as a way of forcing parents to associate their children with
individuals that the parent might appropriately wish to cut out.
Children may be more harmed than benefited by maintaining
relationships with multiple adults because a child can only be emo-
tionally dependent on a limited number of people.  “[H]anding out
new parental rights is a zero-sum game: where a right is enlarged for
one party, it is diminished for the other.”241  Children of divorce often
feel caught between their parents; fractured family units resulting
from break-ups would be all the more painful for children if they have
three or four parents who they may feel are owed their allegiance—a
child might feel caught not just between two worlds, but between
three or four.  Professor Margaret Brinig analyzes a child’s relation-
ship with multiple interested adults in light of Michael Heller’s com-
mons/anti-commons theory242: a child’s time, loyalty, and emotional
energy are finite resources.  If too many parents attempt to manage
the child’s development, the tragedy of the commons occurs—no par-
ent can effectively accomplish his or her task without being undercut
by someone else.  By the same token, if too many parents are able to
veto another parent’s decisions the tragedy of the anti-commons
occurs—the ability of many to veto prevents any development.
Research suggests that larger networks of family are not always
preferable—Professors Kristen Harknett and Jean Knab found that
smaller and denser kin networks seemed to be superior to broader,
weaker kin networks.243  That study focused on multi-partner fertility,
or the experience of having children with more than one partner, but
results shed light on situations involving three parents as well.
Though having children with multiple partners increased the number
of parents (and accordingly extended families) for any given group of
minor children sharing one common parent, the “larger kin networks
do not translate into greater availability of social network support in
financial, housing, and child-care areas.”244  These findings call into
241 Wilson, supra note 71, at 1115; see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (“The extension of statutory rights in this area to persons other
than a child’s parents, however, comes with an obvious cost.  For example, the State’s
recognition of an independent third-party interest in a child can place a substantial
burden on the traditional parent-child relationship.”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (plurality opinion); Baker, supra note 18, at 131–32 (discussing
how negative and positive parental rights can cut against each other in a diminishing
manner).
242 BRINIG, supra note 229, at 137–38. R
243 See Kristen Harknett & Jean Knab, More Kin, Less Support: Multipartnered Fertility
and Perceived Support Among Mothers, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 237 (2007).
244 Id. at 249.
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question the suggestion that more parents would provide more emo-
tional and physical resources for children, and suggest instead that an
increased number of parental relationships results in watered-down
relationships.
Recent scholarship has cast serious doubt on the concept that
continuing contact between a child and adults with whom he or she
was close is always beneficial to the child.  Maintaining contact with
adults after family unit dissolution or non-formation can bring new
dangers as new partners of each parent are brought into close proxim-
ity of the child.245  Adults (and men in particular) do not invest in or
engage with non-biological children to the same degree as they do in
their own biological children.246  Regardless of biological connection,
children face increased risk of abuse by adults who did not reside with
them from their infancy.247  While children who live in households
with their married biological parents still “generally fare better than
teenagers living in any other family  type,”248 simply having more par-
ents involved is not necessarily better for children.  Professors Man-
ning and Lamb found that teenagers whose mothers were living with
or married to a new partner were not uniformly advantaged compared
to their peers living in single-mother families.249  Other studies have
suggested that “the gains children realize from living with nongenetic
caretakers may not be as great as we would otherwise suppose, and
may represent only modest welfare increases over living alone with
their mothers.”250  These findings are in keeping with the Parham pre-
sumption that parents know what is best for their children and will act
in accordance with that knowledge.  Scholarship on the issue remains
unsettled as to whether biology, evolutionary impulses, or raising a
245 See generally Wilson, supra note 71 (arguing that expanding the rights of ex-
partners pursuant to the ALI’s schema will likely result in increased physical and sex-
ual abuse and neglect).
246 See Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads Equal?: Biology Ver-
sus Marriage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213, 224 (2003)
(examining results from a study analyzing father involvement in “blended families,”
through the lens of the relationship to the father-figure); Wilson, supra note 75, at
103–06 (reviewing studies that “suggest that biology produces real differences in
investment and outcomes for children”).
247 Wilson, supra note 75, at 115.
248 Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-Being in Cohabiting,
Married, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 885 (2003); see Hofferth
& Anderson, supra note 246, at 230 (noting how fathers who have lived with children R
longer fare better in the familial relationships).
249 Manning & Lamb, supra note 248, at 890. R
250 Wilson, supra note 75, at 106.
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child from infancy gives rise to the presumption, but the presumption
nonetheless exists.251
As the class of people eligible for custodial rights grows, so, too,
would the amount of litigation.  As adults are given more avenues of
attaining the status of parenthood, courts would be required to adju-
dicate disputes more frequently, especially as disagreements over
child-rearing occur.252  Married and cohabiting parents are forced to
mediate their disagreements over child-rearing if for no other reason
than to keep the peace in the household; the more parents a child
has, the less likely those parents would be to peaceably sort out their
differences and the more likely they would be to seek judicial inter-
vention.253  Courts prefer to stay out of adjudications of parenting
style as much as possible due mainly to the Parham presumption that
parents know what is best for their children.  Judges recognize that
they lack the specialized knowledge necessary to make informed deci-
sions—parents generally know the most about what their child needs.
Courts are unwilling to adjudicate such matters unless a parent is
shown to be unfit.  Families, and children especially, need stability in
order to be healthy.  Breaking down traditional concepts of
parenthood and presumptions of parenthood decreases familial sta-
bility, as family units would be subject to questioning and even poten-
tial reorganization by courts.254
Judicial records are replete with cases where parental animosity
has prevented parents from making the best decisions for their chil-
dren, and in such cases provision of visitation and even parental
rights-like shares of custody to ex-partners and other third parties is
surely a positive thing for the child.255  However, state legal regimes
must balance these cases against three things: the constitutional pre-
sumption that the parent knows what is best for the child and will
251 Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 246, at 214–18 (discussing various theories R
leading to increased paternal investment).
252 See Baker, supra note 18, at 133 (“Giving de facto parents rights increases the
state’s involvement in the child rearing process.  The more people who can claim
relationship rights, the more people there are who can petition a court to alter or
solidify a custodial arrangement, and the more courts end up deciding what is in a
child’s best interest.”); Wilson, supra note 75, at 100 (suggesting that litigation would
be encouraged once courts begin conferring substantive rights on ex live-in partners).
253 See Duncan, supra note 129, at 269. R
254 Id. at 263.
255 See Wilson, supra note 75, at 92 (“No one doubts that some children will be
made better off by preserving a connection with a de facto parent.  But this gain may
not be as great as we might think it would be by extrapolating from biological par-
ents.” (footnote omitted)).
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make decisions for the child accordingly,256 the practical need for
parental autonomy, and the reality that more than two parents
involved in a child’s life will be more likely to lead to trouble than to
peaceable resolution and development.
CONCLUSION
  Senator Leno’s Bill was ultimately vetoed by Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Jr.257  It is likely that a largely similar bill will be passed in the
near future—something in which Shannon Minter, the Legal Director
of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, expressed confidence.258
This Bill and others like it come from good intentions—few disagree
that provision for children and the myriad of families in which chil-
dren find themselves is a positive thing.  Ultimately, however, this Bill
would have negatively impacted children in California by watering
down the concept of parenthood so as to make the task of raising
productive, healthy children that much more difficult for parents to
achieve.  The Bill attempts to “put[ ] the best interest of the child
above all else,”259 but this Note argues that children would be best
served by limiting the number of parents a child has to two so that
those parents are able to act in the best interests of their child.  Before
moving further into the realm of state-sanctioned multiple
parenthood, at a minimum more research and thought is necessary to
evaluate the potential impacts on children.
256 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
257 Senate Bill 1476 Veto Message, supra note 23.
258 Cheryl Wetzstein, Two Parents of Child Could Become 3 Under Bill: Brown’s Veto
Seen as Just a Delay in Letting Courts Decide, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2012), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/10/two-parents-of-child-could-become-3-
under-bill.
259 ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1476, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess.,
at 8 (Cal., June 26, 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/
sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_cfa_20120625_111935_asm_comm.html.
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